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Message Text

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, KS
SUBJECT: SANKEI REPORT ON US NEW DEFENSE LINE

REF: A. STATE 091052 B. TOKYO 5310

1. EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF APRIL 21 SANKEI SHIMBUN ON ALLEGED NEW US DEFENSE LINE EXCLUDING ROK FOLLOWS. LIKE TOKYO SHIMBUN ARTICLE ON SAME SUBJECT (REF B), SANKEI STORY IS ALSO DATELINED WASHINGTON. SANKEI STORY BY CORRESPONDENT MAKOTO KAWANAGO, TOKYO SHIMBUN'S WAS BY YOSHIMURA. JAPANESE PRESS CARRIED DEPARTMENT'S DENIAL.

2. BEGIN QUOTE. US DEFENSE LINE TO BE FROM JAPAN TO THE PHILIPPINES; BASIC CONCEPT OF ITS NEW ASIAN POLICY; TO CUT OFF SOUTHEAST ASIA; TO STRENGTHEN DEPENDENCE ON JAPAN POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY; GOVERNMENT SOURCE'S REACTIONS. THE US GOVERNMENT HAS STARTED A BASIC RE-STUDY OF ITS MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM ASIAN POLICY, AFTER THE "COLLAPSE OF INDO-CHINA," AND IT SEEMS THAT ITS BASIC WAY OF THINKING IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) THE SEPARATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM THE UNITED STATES' DEFENSE LINE; (2) AS A RESULT, THE WITHDRAWING AND PUSHING OF THE DEFENSE LINE MORE TO THENORTH, TO THE LINE LINKING JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES, AND UNCLASSIFIED

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TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THIS LINE; AND (3) TO ATTACH GREATER EXPECTATIONSON THE ROLE TO BE FULFILLED BY JAPAN IN ASIA, BASED ON ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY. IT ALSO SEEMS TO BE PREDICTING THAT, AFTER THE "COLLAPSE" OF INDO-CHINA, NORTH VIETNAM

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WILL LEAN MORE TO THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE CAMBODIA WILL LEAN MORE TOWARD CHINA. AS REGARDS SOUTH VIETNAM, IT SEEMS TO BE THINKING IN THE DIRECTION THAT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS PLACED UNDER THE PRO-VISIONAL REVOLUTINARY GOVERNMENT, THE US WILL ENCOURAGE ITS "INDEPENDENCE" FROM NORTH VIETNAM, AND WILL MAKE EFFORTS TO KEEP IT ON THE SIDE OF JAPAN AND THE US.

3. SINCE US PRESIDENT FORD'S SPEECH ONTHE 10TH, WHICH VIRTUALLY "GAVE UP" INDO-CHINA, THE US GOVERNMENT'S SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER HAVE BEEN MAKING STATEMENTS, THOUGH ONLY FRAGMENTARILY, WHICH INDICATE THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE UNITED STATES' GLOBAL DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY POLICIES. THEY HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE US FOR THE ENSURING OF SECURITY, AND AS THE WORLD'S STRONGEST POWER, THAT IT WILL NOT RETURN TO ISOLATIONISM, THAT EVEN IF IT LOSES INDO-CHINA, IT WILL UPHOLD ITS COMMITMENTS TO OTHER ALLIES, AND THAT THE US WILL ENGAGE IN JOINT DEFENSE, EVEN BY SENDING IN US FORCES, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR COUNTRIES "OTHER THAN" INDO-CHINA. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY INDICATED AS THE BASIC POLICY THE MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY FOR EASING TENSION WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE.

4. IN THE US CONGRESS, TOO, SENATE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY LEADER MANSFIELD STATED THAT, IN THE FUTURE, THE US BASIC POLICY SHOULD BE TO AVOID SENDING IN US FORCES, OTHER THAN FOR REASONS OF ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE US ITSELF, AND TO REFRAIN FROM GIVING FOREIGN AID TO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT MAKING SELF-HELP EFFORTS. THE US CONGRESS WAS ACTUALLY THE MAIN FORCE WHICH COMPELLED THE "ABANDONMENT" OF INDO-CHINA THIS TIME, AND ITS POWER TO MOVE US DIPLOMACY EXCEEDS THAT OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION. FURTHERMORE, AS PRESIDENT FORD HIMSELF PROMISED TO CONDUCT "DIPLOMACY IN UNITY" WITH CONGRESS, IN THE FUTURE, IT OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE FORMATION OF FUTURE US POLICIES.

5. WITH THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE BACKGROUND, IT IS SAID THAT ITS NEW ASIAN POLICY, WHICH IS NOW BEING STUDIED WITHIN US
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GOVERNMENT CIRCLES, IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS.

6. FIRST, THE NEW MILITARY DEFENSE LINE OF THE US FORCES IN ASIA (MILITARY BASES WHERE US FORCES WILL BE STATIONED) WILL BE LOCATED ALONG THE ISLANDS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC, INCUDING JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES AND GUAM. AND, SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL BE CUT AWAY FROM" THE DEFENSE LINE. AS FOR THE ROK AND TAIWAN, THEY WILL NOT COME UNDER THE MAINSTAY LINE OF THE US DEFENSE LINE, BUT WILL BE ATTACHED IN THE FORM A "BRANCH", LINKED WITH THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, POWERFUL ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS WILL NATURALLY CONTINUE, IN THE PACIFIC REGION, BUT THEIR MEANING FOR "POST-INDO-CHINA" ASIAN DEFENSE WILL DECREASE. IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, DIEGO GARCIA ISLAND WILL BECOME THE KEY

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DEFENSE BASE.

7. THE SECOND POINT IS TO SEEK OF JAPAN STILL MORE ITS FULFILLING THE ROLE OF THE FOUNDATION FOR THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF ASIA. IT IS EVEN BEING SAID THAT THE ROLE ACCOUNTED FOR BY JAPAN IN ASIA IS "80 PERCENT," AND THE US IS ATTACHING EXPECTATIONS ON THE ENERGY RESOURCES AND FOODSTUFF QUESTIONS IN THE FIELD RELATED TO THE ECONOMY, AND ON THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY, IN THE MILITARY-RELATED FIELD.

8. THE THIRD POINT IS THE MAINTENANCE AND STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDLY AND STABLE RELATIONS IN US-CHINA RELATIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS, THE US DOES NOT EXPECT, EVEN IN THE CASE OF THE "COMMUNIZATION" OF INDO-CHINA IN THE FUTURE, THAT IT WILL TAKE THE PATTERN OF THE COLD WAR AGE, WHERE IT WILL BE COMPLETELY SWALLOWED INTO THE CHINESE AND SOVIET SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. IT RATHER EXPECTS THE SAID AREA TO STRENGHTEN FURTHER ITS NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE POLICY LINE, AS IN THE CASE OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND THAT IT WILL STRENGTHEN ITS OWN "SEPARATE COLORING" AND THE COLORING OF STANDING BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS MEANING, IT SEEMS TO HAVE COME TO THE JUDGMENT THAT, EVEN IF SOUTHEAST ASIA IS CUT OFF, IT WILL NOT BE IMPORTANT, MILITARY.
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9. AS FOR POST-WAR INDO-CHINA, IT SEEMS TO BE ATTACHING EXPECTATIONS ON THE BASIC POLICY OF JAPAN AND THE US GIVING AID TO IT TOGETHER, AS A WHOLE. IT IS SAID THAT THE US SIDE'S

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EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION OVER JAPAN'S AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, AT THE TALKS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA AND SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ON THE 13TH, WAS MEANT AS "ITS BEING STILL TOO EARLY, AT THE PRESENT TIME."

10. IN REGARD TO JAPAN, THE US TAKES THE VIEW THAT "IT IS VITAL (DECISIVELY IMPORTANT) FOR THE US IN ASIA, "AND IT IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING ITS WAY OF THINKING THAT THE SECURITY TREATY IS THE SYMBOL OF THIS.

11. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS RATHER THE US, WHICH IS MORE PLEASED WITH THE RE-CONFIRMATION OF THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY AT THE MIYAZAWA-KISSINGER TALKS ON THE 13TH. AND, IN REGARD TO THE POINT THAT IN THE REASSURANCE THIS TIME, THE MILITARY ASPECT, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, WAS ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED, THE US SIDE IS EXPRESSING WELCOME, NOTING THAT JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE US-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY, AFTER PASSING THROUGH THE PERIODS OF FIRST SHOWING A REJECTION ATTITUDE AND THEN RECOGNIZING ITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE, "HAS NOW DISCOVERED THE BEST UNCLASSIFIED

POSITION."

12. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY CHANGES IN US MILITARY BASES IN JAPAN, WITH THE US DEFENSE LINE "MOVING UP NORTHWARD AND BECOMING MORE CONCENTRATED" ON THE JAPAN-PHILIPPINES LINE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE TWO HINTS IN THIS CNNECTION. ONE IS THAT THERE IS THE SAYING WITHIN US GOVERNMENT CIRCLES THAT "THE ROLE OF THE US FORCES IN JAPAN IS 60 PERCENT FOR THE STABILIZATION OF ASIA, CENTERINGON THE ROK, 30 PERCENT IS FOR THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN, AND 10 PERCENT FOR THE CURBING OF JAPAN'S REARMAMENT AND THE REVIVAL OF MILITARISM." "THE CURBING OF MILITARISM" IN THE LAST PART, IS SAID TO BE A MATTER OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA.

13. THE SECOND HINT LIES IN THE POINT THAT IT IS SAID THAT THE BASIS OF THE NEW ASIAN POLICY IS SAID TO BE PLACED ON THE CONCEPT OF A "1.5 WAR," WHICH IS BEING PUSHED BY THE US DEFENSE DEPT SINCE THE START OF THE 1970'S. IN THE 1960'S, THE US DEFENSE STRATEGY WAS TO PREPARE NATIONAL DEFENSE POWER, BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF A "2.5 WAR," OR IN OTHER WORDS,THE PREPARING OF DEFENSE POWER "CAPABLE OF COPING EVEN WITH THE SITUATION OF TWO BIG WARS ARISING AT THE SAME TIME IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA, AND OF A MEDIUM-SIZE WAR ARISING AT THE SAME TIME IN SOME OTHER AREA, SUCH AS VIETNAM OR THE MIDDLE EAST."

14. HOWEVER, IN THE LATTER PART OF THE NIXON AGE, NATIONAL DEFENSE POWER WAS REDUCED TO A 1.5-WAR STRUCTURE, THAT IS, A SETUP TO "COPE WITH THE CASE OF ONE BIG WAR, ARISING IN EITHER EUROPE OR IN ASIA, AND A MEDIUM-SIZE WAR ARISING AT THE SAME TIME IN SOME OTHER AREA, "FOLLOWING THE EASING OF TENSION WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH THE REALIZATION

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OF THE VIETNAM CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. UNDER THIS CONCEPT, IT HAS BEEN REDUCING OVERASEAS U.S. MILITARY BASES, AND CUTTING BACK ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CONSOLIDATING THE STRATEGY OF QUICK DISPATCH FROM THE U.S. MAINLAND TO ITS ALLIES, IN THE CASE OF AN EMERGENCY,BY A BIG AIRLIFT OPERATION, USING LARGE-SIZE TRANSPORT PLANES. THE NEW ASIAN POLICY IS SAID TO PUSH THIS WAY OF THINKING MORE THOROUGH-GOINGLY, AT LEAST IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

15. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE WAY OF
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THINKING THAT THE ROK AND TAIWAN ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH JAPAN'S SECURITY, AND THAT IN THIS MEANING, THEY ARE ALSO RELATED TO THE SECURITY OF THE U.S., WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SEEMS TO BE TAKING THE VIEW THAT, IF THERE IS DANGER OF ANOTHER WAR IN ASIA, IT WILL PROBABLY BE THE KOREAN PENINSULA. IN REGARD TO THIS DANGER, IT IS SAID IN THE U.S. THAT "60 PERCENT OF THE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES STATIONED IN THE ROK IS TO COPE WITH AGGRESSION BY NORTH KOREA, BUT 40 PERCENT IS TO HOLD BACK THE ROK'S 'NORTHWARD ADVANCE'." IT CAN BE SAID THAT THESE WORDS SUBSTANTIATE THE U.S. UNEASINESS.

16. AS REGARDS TAIWAN, THE U.S. IS ATTACHING IMPORTANCE TO IT, IN THE MEANING OF SECURING JAPAN'S SHIPPING LANES. ON THIS POINT, IT SEEMS THAT THERE ARE EXPECTATIONS IN SOME CIRCLES THAT TAIWAN WILL COME TO TAKE THE ROAD TOWARD "AUTONOMY", IN THE PATTERN OF HONG KONG, IN THE FUTURE.

17. IT IS SAID THAT THE NEW ASIAN POLICY UNDER THE FORD ADMIN-ISTRATIONWILL COMPLETELY RE-WRITE THE NIXON DOCTRINE, AND THAT IT WILL BE STUDIED "STEADILY, AND WITHOUT HASTE". IT SEEMS CERTAIN, AT ANY RATE, THAT THE U.S. WILL HOLD IN THE DIRECTIONOF FURTHER STRENGTHENING ITS SECURITY TIES (WHICH WILL INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE MILITARY ASPECT BUT ALSO RESOURCES AND FOODSTUFFS) WITH ITS MAJOR ALLIES, SUCH AS JAPAN AND EUROPE..

18. (NEW SUBTITLE) DOUBTFUL WHETHER POLICY DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON JAPAN-PHILIPPINES MILITARYDEFENSE LINE; GOVERNMENT SOURCE; WILL ASCERTAIN TRUE INTENTIONS THROUGHPRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO U.S) CONCERNING THE REPORT THAT THE U.S. IS NOW STUDYING THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATING SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS FROM ITS MILITARY DEFENSE LINE AND OF PULLING IT BACK TO THE LINE LINKING JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES, A GOVERNMENT SOURCE SHOWED A CAUTIOUS VIEW, ON THE 20TH, AND AVOIDED MAKING ANY COMMENTS ON IT AT ALL, SAYING: "IT IS ONE WAY OF THINKING, WHICH CAN BE INTERPRETED FROM THE FORD SPEECH, ETC., BUT IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. IS RATHER MAKING A MORE CAREFUL STUDY. IT CANNOT BE THOUGHT THAT U.S. VIEWS HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED, AT THE PRESENT TIME."
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19. THE CONCEPT OF MAKING JAPAN THE KEYSTONE OF ITS DEFENSE LINE CAN BE SEEN EVEN FROM PRESIDENT FORD'S FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH THE OTHER DAY. HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF DRAWING THE MILITARY DEFENSE LINE, WITH JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES AS THE AXIS, AS REPORTED, A VERY BIG CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE U.S. FORCES' MILITARYBASES IN JAPAN, THE RETRENCHMENT AND INTEGRATION OFWHICH ARE NOW BEING PUSHED, WILL BE UNAVOIDABLE.

20. THIS WILL ALSO MEAN THAT JAPAN'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY-ENSURING MEASURES WILL BE COMPELLED TO MAKE A BIG CHANGE, AND THIS WILL INEVITABLY BECOME A BIG POLITICAL ISSUE. EVEN IN ORDER TO AVERT SUCHCONTROVERSIES, THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE TAKING THE ATTITUDE THAT "THE FIRST THING IS TO VERIFY WITH THE U.S. SIDE THE FACTUAL RELATIONS."

21. HOWEVER, EVEN THE GOVERNMENT REGARDS IT AS TRUE THAT THE U.S. HAS STARTED A RE-STUDY OF ITS ASIAN POLICY, WHILE WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

22. IT ALSO TAKES THE VIEW THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR JAPAN AND THE U.S. TO PILE UP CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON HOW TO PUSH THEIR
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RESPECTIVE ASIAN POLICIES IN THE FUTURE, TOO. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THERE WILL BE PROBING TALKS AT THE US-JAPAN SUMMIT

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TALKS TO BE HELD WHEN PRIME MINISTER MIKI VISITS THE U.S. IN AUGUST, FOLLOWING FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA'S VISIT TO THE U.S. THE OTHER DAY.

23. THOUGH NOTING THAT THE U.S. SIDE'S CONCEPT, WHICH WAS CLARIFIED, CONTAINS CONSIDERABLY BOLD VIEWS, THE JAPANESE SIDE POINTS OUT THAT IT FAILS TO MAKE CLEAR SOME IMPORTANT POINTS.

24. THE FIRST POINT IS THAT IT DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR WHAT THE POSITION OF THAILAND, WHICH IS MAINTAINING CALMNESS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, WILL BE. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE U.S. FORCES MAINTAIN MILITARY BASES IN THAILAND, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SEATO, AND IT IS AN IMPORTANT BASE FOR THE U.S. HOWEVER, TH NEW POLICY DOES NOT TOUCH UPON THIS COUNTRY IN ANY POSITIVE WAY.

25. SECONDLY, IT DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR HOW IT WILL REGARD INDONESIA, WHICH TOUGH NOT OFFERING BASES FOR THE U.S. FORCES, IS FULFILLING AN IMPORTANT ROLE, AS A LEADING COUNTRY OF ASEAN.

26. STILL FURTHER, AS THE THIRD POINT, THEEE WILL REMAIN THE QUESTION OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE "DOMINO THEORY", WHICH HAD PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR THE UNITED STATES' ASIAN POLICY SO FAR.

27. FROM THESE POINTS, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION ARISING, WHERE JAPAN WILL ALSO EXPRESS OBJECTIONS, IF THE U.S. WERE ACTUALLY TO FORMULATE A BOLD POLICY OF SEPARATING OFF SOUTHEAST ASIA. END QUOTE.
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